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Abstract
The Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was left in crisis following intense pressure from
survivors and their families, the public and media. Two senior legal figures, Baroness Butler-Sloss and Fiona
Woolf, both resigned from the position of  chair to the inquiry following concerns over their links with the
establishment. Questions were raised over the independence of  a process convened by the Home Secretary, to
investigate apparent failures on the part of  institutions, which would include scrutinising the actions of  a
former Home Secretary in handling allegations of  child sexual abuse in the past. Demands for an inquiry
with greater statutory powers, including the power to compel the giving of  evidence on oath, ultimately
resulted in the Independent Panel being disbanded and a new public inquiry, the Independent Inquiry into
Child Sexual Abuse, being convened. Against the background of  this and other inquiries, this article
examines the serious questions raised about the powers of  a minister to set up a public inquiry, the lack of
open and transparent decision-making processes and the extent to which those ministerial decisions are open
to public scrutiny and accountability.
Introduction
One of  the key functions of  a public inquiry convened by a minister into a matter ofpublic concern is to hold those in authority to account. It is therefore essential that a
public inquiry is set up in such a way as to command public confidence and trust in the
independence and integrity of  the resultant inquiry and its findings. The establishment of
the Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse in 20142 prompted an eight-month
period of  intense pressure and lobbying from the survivors and their families, the public
and the media, who were unhappy with the way in which it had been convened. It resulted
in the resignation of  two chairs to the inquiry, the original panel being dissolved and a new
public inquiry, the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA)3 being convened
on a statutory basis.4
NILQ summer 2016
1     I am very grateful to Robert Lee and Jonathan Doak for much helpful insight into the development of  this
article. 
2     An independent inquiry panel of  experts in the law of  child protection to consider whether public bodies and
other non-state institutions have taken seriously their duty of  care to protect children from sexual abuse: HC
Deb 7 July 2014, vol 584, col 25.
3     <www.iicsa.org.uk/>
4     HC Deb 7 July 2014, vol 584, col 25. Hearings are due to commence in 2016. 
The Seven Principles of  Public Life,5 devised by the Committee on Standards in
Public Life,6 set out the basis of  the ethical standards expected of  public office-holders.
They include the requirement for openness: 
Holders of  public office should act and take decisions in an open and transparent
manner. Information should not be withheld from the public unless there are
clear and lawful reasons for so doing.
And accountability: 
Holders of  public office are accountable to the public for their decisions and
actions and must submit themselves to the scrutiny necessary to ensure this.7
Whilst not legally binding, these principles have come to inform public life and other
codes of  conduct, such as the Ministerial Code,8 which sets out the standards of  conduct
expected of  ministers, and also to inform legislation.9 In this article I argue that the lack
of  open and transparent decision-making processes when a public inquiry is convened
and the absence, in the public domain, of  clear published criteria and reasoning behind
those decisions, restricts the scope for public scrutiny and accountability. This in turn can
damage public confidence in the ensuing public inquiry and its findings, by giving rise to
concerns over the motives behind the decisions made and a lack of  independence of  the
inquiry process from government and the executive.
Ministerial decisions taken when convening a public inquiry may be challenged by
judicial review, but there are a number of  practical limitations to this as a safeguard.
Ministers are accountable to Parliament and the electorate and, as the IICSA itself
illustrates, public pressure can influence ministerial decisions. However, there is no formal
process by which representations may be made to the minister, nor any requirement for
public consultation. The extent to which the public and interested parties have influenced
such decisions has varied widely between inquiries. 
By way of  background, with particular reference to the IICSA, and also to other key
public inquiries such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Public Inquiry
(hereinafter Mid Staffordshire Inquiry), Litvinenko and Chilcot Inquiries,10 this article
firstly examines the considerable discretion afforded to the minister over whether or not
an inquiry is convened, what powers an inquiry is given, the appointment of  its chair and
the setting of  its terms of  reference, which all have a fundamental impact on the nature
of  the inquiry and public perception of  its independence and integrity. Secondly, it
analyses the extent to which the exercise of  that discretion is transparent and open to
public scrutiny and accountability and the scope for victims, survivors and their families,
and the wider public, to influence or challenge the decisions reached. 
The 2014 House of  Lords Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005 (hereinafter
the HL Select Committee) provided the first parliamentary post-legislative scrutiny of  the
Inquiries Act 2005 and considered the law and practice relating to inquiries into matters
of  public concern, in particular those convened under the Inquiries Act 2005 (hereinafter
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5     Committee on Standards in Public Life, ‘The Seven Principles of  Public Life’ (May 1995). Also known as the
Nolan Principles. 
6     A public body that advises the UK government on ethical standards across public life in the UK.
7     Seven Principles (n 5) principles 5 and 4 respectively
8     The most recent version of  which is the Cabinet Office, Ministerial Code, October 2015.
9     Such as the Freedom of  Information Act 2000
10   Inquiry to examine the Commissioning, Supervisory and Regulatory Organisations in Relation to their
Monitoring Role at Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust between January 2005 and March 2009; Inquiry
to Investigate the Death of  Alexander Litvinenko on 23 November 2006; Inquiry into the UK’s involvement
in the Conflict in Iraq.
the 2005 Act). It took evidence from inquiry chairs and secretaries, lawyers and
academics, inquiry witnesses, interest groups and others. This article draws on that
evidence, the report produced (hereinafter 2014 Select Committee Report),11 and the
government’s written response (hereinafter Government Response),12 together with
parliamentary debates, government publications, media reports and wider literature. 
Convening a public inquiry
ROLE
Before considering the significance of  the ministerial decisions taken while setting up
public inquiries, it is helpful to first consider the role of  public inquiries. Public inquiries
may serve a number of  different purposes: establishing the facts; determining
accountability; learning lessons and making recommendations to prevent recurrence;
restoring public confidence; catharsis; developing public policy and discharging
investigative obligations under Articles 2 and 313 of  the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).14 They may also vary greatly in terms of  the nature of  their subject.
Some cover events which suggest a breakdown in the rule of  law, such as the Scott
Inquiry,15 some involve a single death, such as the Victoria Climbié Inquiry, and others
many deaths, as with the Shipman Inquiry.16 But what they all share is that they are
inquiries into significant matters of  public concern.17
A call for a public inquiry will frequently occur immediately following an event causing
national concern. However, there may be a long delay, such as in the case of  the IICSA,
where calls for a public inquiry into wide-scale child abuse came years after the events,
triggered by press reports on Jimmy Savile’s behaviour, following his death in 2012.18 By
the time a minister is faced with the decision of  whether or not to convene a public inquiry,
a momentum of  public pressure may have built up from the media, the families of  victims,
victim support groups, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and from the lobbying of
Parliament by individuals and pressure groups. The minister may be under considerable
pressure to act quickly. Many groups will express frustration at the apparent failures of  the
system and feel that, without a public inquiry, their voice will not be heard.19
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11   HL Select Committee, The Inquiries Act 2005: Post-legislative Scrutiny (HL 2013–2014 143).
12   Ministry of  Justice, Government Response to the Report of  the House of  Lords Select Committee on the Inquiries Act 2005
(Cm 8093 2014)
13   The rights to life and to not be tortured or subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. 
14   List from Jason Beer et al, Public Inquiries (OUP 2011) paras 1.02–10 
15   Inquiry into the Export of  Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions.
16   Cabinet Secretary Advice Note on the Establishment of  a Judicial Inquiry into Phone Hacking (19 March
2010) <www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60808/cabinet-secretary-
advice-judicial.pdf>. 
17   On the role and functions of  public inquiries, see also Mark Elliott and Robert Thomas, Public Law 2nd edn
(OUP 2014) ch 17, para 2.2.
18   ‘Jimmy Savile Accused of  Sexual Abuse’ BBC News (1 October 2012) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-
arts-19776872>.
19   For example, see ‘Bishop Calls for Buncefield Inquiry’ Evening Standard (London, 11 January 2006)
<www.standard.co.uk/newsheadlines/bishop-calls-for-buncefield-inquiry-7084716.html> and David Conn,
‘Theresa May to Heed Campaigners’ Call for Inquiry into Battle of  Orgreave’ The Guardian (London, 15
December 2015) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/dec/15/theresa-may-to-heed-campaigners-call-for-
inquiry-into-battle-of-orgreave>.
MINISTERIAL POWERS
The decisions whether or not to convene an inquiry and, if  so, its nature, are for the
minister whose department is most relevant to the matter of  public concern (as discussed
in greater detail below). There is no process by which those demanding a public inquiry
can make an application and the court cannot mandate a minister to call a public inquiry.
Whilst Parliament does not itself  have power to set up a public inquiry, it can exert
political pressure on a minister to do so and the public may apply pressure on Parliament
by lobbying both Houses, through letters, presentations, briefings and meetings and
through the media. In the case of  the IICSA, the announcement of  a public inquiry came
relatively soon after the call. However, in many cases, such as that of  the Mid
Staffordshire Inquiry, there may be a protracted period of  campaigning before an inquiry
is convened.20 In many cases, a call for an inquiry will be unsuccessful.21
The minister must also decide the extent to which any inquiry will be held in public.
Not all inquiries into matters of  public concern are public inquiries; inquiries may be held
entirely in public, in private, or a combination of  the two. (The Chilcot Inquiry is an
example of  a public inquiry that held a number of  its hearings in private.) There is no
automatic entitlement to a public inquiry as opposed to a private inquiry and, again, the
decision as to whether the advantages of  a closed inquiry outweigh those of  an open
inquiry is predominantly a matter for the minister.22 It seems right in principle that an
inquiry into matters of  public concern should itself  be heard in public unless there is a
strong public-interest argument for the inquiry, or some part of  it, to be heard in
private,23 for example, to protect matters of  national importance or security. The 2005
Act includes a presumption that inquiries into matters of  public concern will be held in
public. However, as is argued below, ministers on occasions appear to be choosing to side-
step the use of  this legislation, which has given rise to concerns that some such decisions
may have been motivated by a wish to conceal or suppress some aspects of  the truth from
the public. There has been much debate over ministerial decisions to hold all or part of
an inquiry in private, with many such decisions being the subject of  judicial review
proceedings,24 as well as public and media scrutiny. 
A further decision for the minister is the basis upon which a public inquiry is to be
convened. As considered in more detail below, inquiries may be statutory or non-statutory
in nature. Most statutory inquiries are now held under the 2005 Act, s 1 of  which provides
that a minister ‘may’ cause an inquiry to be held under the Act. The power to convene a
non-statutory public inquiry falls under the general ministerial prerogative. Again,
ministerial discretion is extremely broad. There is no formula or criteria in the 2005 Act
for convening a statutory inquiry beyond those stated in s 1: 
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20   See Julie Bailey oral evidence taken before the HL Select Committee (23 October 2013) Q173: ‘Select
Committee on the Inquiries Act 2002: Written and Corrected Oral Evidence’ <www.parliament.uk/
documents/lords-committees/Inquiries-Act-2005/IA_Written_Oral_evidencevol.pdf>.
21   Such as the call for a public inquiry into the death of  four soldiers at Deepcut Barracks and the death in
custody of  teenager Joseph Scholes 
22   See Scott Baker JR (Persey) v Secretary of  State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2002] EWHC 371 (Admin),
[2003] QB 794, para 69.
23   See Report of  the Royal Commission on Tribunals of  Inquiry (Cmnd 3121 1966) para 40 (Salmon Report).
24   See R v Secretary of  State for Health, ex parte Crampton (CA, 9 July 1993) (the Allitt Inquiry); R v Secretary of  State
for Health, ex parte Wagstaff; R v Secretary of  State for Health ex parte Associated Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 292
(the Shipman Inquiry); R (Persey) v Secretary of  State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2002] EWHC 371
(Admin) (the Foot and Mouth Inquiry).
where it appears to him that— 
(a) particular events have caused, or are capable of  causing, public concern, or 
(b) there is public concern that particular events may have occurred.
For a non-statutory inquiry, there are no criteria at all. 
Precisely which minister is responsible for an inquiry is an administrative or political
decision, rather than a legal one. An area of  concern frequently raised is that the minister
exercising the discretion, and making the decision about whether or not to set up a public
inquiry, is often the minister for the department that is, or may find itself, under
scrutiny.25 Equally, the actions of  the government itself  may be under scrutiny.26 This can
generate significant public concern over the clear conflict of  interest that arises and the
lack of  independence of  an inquiry from government and ministerial departments. 
Whilst setting up an inquiry should not be a political decision, political considerations
frequently influence the decision. Calls for both the Marchioness and Mid Staffordshire
Inquiries were initially refused by the then government, but promised by the opposition,
which then convened the public inquiries on coming to power.27 The request for the
Litvinenko Inquiry was initially refused because of  concerns about damaging UK
relations with Russia.28 It is an often-quoted belief29 that a minister will concede a public
inquiry to appease immediate pressure from the public and media and ‘kick the issues into
the long grass’, hoping that public interest and political criticism will have faded by the
time the inquiry report is produced.30
TRANSPARENCY
Concern over the motives behind a decision is exacerbated by the lack of  transparency.
As Eversheds31 noted in written evidence before the HL Select Committee, ‘there is no
transparency in the decision-making process conducted by Ministers/Government when
deciding to set up, or not set up, an inquiry and the public is often not fully appraised of
the reasons behind a particular decision being made’.32
Despite the fact that the 2005 Public Administration Select Committee report,
Government by Inquiry, recommended that ministers should justify their decision whether or
not to hold an inquiry based on a published set of  criteria (and proposing some criteria
that might form a basis for this),33 the later 2014 Select Committee Report rejected
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25   For example, the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry.
26   For example, the Bloody Sunday and Chilcot Inquiries.
27   See, for example, Julie Bryant on the effect of  the change of  government on the call for the Mid Staffordshire
Inquiry, oral evidence taken before the HL Select Committee (23 October 2013) Q162.
28   The Home Secretary admitting ‘international relations’ were a factor in the government’s decision not to hold
a public inquiry. See Terri Judd, ‘Alexander Litvinenko death: Theresa May admits “international relations”
affected Ruling’ The Independent (London, 19 July 2013) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
alexander-litvinenko-death-theresa-may-admits-international-relations-affected-ruling-8720405.html>.
29   See, for example, Steve Richards, ‘The Real Purpose of  Public Inquiries’ The Independent (London, 16 June
2010) and Simon Jenkins, ‘Politicians Who Demand Inquiries Should be Taken Out and Shot’ The Guardian
(London, 25 June 2013).
30   The 2014 Select Committee Report noted that it had received no evidence of  this for statutory inquiries
though it did receive evidence from Liberty to the effect that this was the purpose of  the Detainee Inquiry.
See HL Select Committee (n 11) para 98.
31   An international law firm and solicitors to the Bloody Sunday, Shipman, Rosemary Nelson and Mid
Staffordshire Inquiries, and who acted for the Metropolitan Police Authority in the Leveson Inquiry.
32   Eversheds’ written evidence to the HL Select Committee (n 20) para 13. 
33   Public Administration Select Committee, Government by Inquiry (HC 2004–2005, 51-I) para 184.
similar suggestions made by witnesses before it.34 It warned ‘there is a danger fixed
criteria might fetter discretion and so limit the circumstances when an inquiry may be set
up’ and concluded that ‘there neither can nor should be fixed criteria regulating the setting
up of  inquiries’.35 It also concluded that:
. . . it is right that the power to establish a public inquiry should be held by a
minister of  the relevant department. The fact that ministers are accountable to
Parliament, and that Parliament can always call for an inquiry to be set up, allows
sufficient Parliamentary involvement in the process.
Whilst recognising the need to avoid the introduction of  over-prescriptive criteria, it is
argued that the introduction of  broad criteria or guidance, as well as engaging more
openly with those campaigning for a public inquiry, and the wider public, at an early stage
would go a long way towards addressing concerns and managing expectations. 
In addition to the absence of  published criteria by which the decision is reached,
currently, there is not even a requirement for a minister to give reasons when refusing a
public inquiry. Ministerial statements to Parliament are often, but not always, given.
(Reasons that have been given include the thoroughness of  earlier investigations,36 cost,
time and money, and international relations.37 A minister may also be concerned about
the possibility of  setting a precedent, and thereby increasing calls for a public inquiry, as
well as timing issues, for example, proximity to an election, which would raise questions
over motivation.)38
Concluding that calls for a public inquiry are frequent and numerous and it would be
impractical to record and respond to every call,39 rather than suggesting criteria for when
reasons should be given, the Select Committee recommended that ministers retain a general
discretion as to when to give reasons for their decisions, but added that reasons not to hold
an inquiry should always be given to Parliament where there has been a ‘failure in regulation’
and following a request by a coroner to convert an inquest into an inquiry.40 The government
accepted there should be ‘some explanation’ of  a decision not to convene a statutory inquiry,
only in the circumstances identified and for domestic bodies, and following a request to
convert an inquest,41 but there was no suggestion of  legislative change. 
Whilst this may go some way towards improving accountability to Parliament in these
circumstances, it is argued that it does not go far enough to address wider concerns over
the lack of  transparency of  the decision-making process and the effect on public
confidence in the public inquiry process. There are frequent calls for clearer criteria and
reasoning from those campaigning for public inquiries.42 The absence of  any published
criteria or guidance as to when an inquiry may or may not be convened, and the fact that
there will be occasions when no reasons are given for refusing a public inquiry,
exacerbates concerns about the motivation behind those decisions. 
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34   See, for example, Robert Francis QC, written evidence to the HL Select Committee (n 20) para 14. 
35   HL Select Committee (n 11) para 51.
36   For example, the death of  Daniel Morgan; the death of  four soldiers at Deepcut Barracks; and Mid
Staffordshire (decision later reversed).
37   The death of  Alexander Litvinenko.
38   Cabinet Secretary Advice Note (n 16).
39   HL Select Committee (n 11) para 110.
40   Ibid paras 111–12.
41   Ministry of  Justice (n 12) paras 33–36.
42   See, for example, Christopher Jefferies and Julie Bryant, oral evidence taken before the HL Select Committee
(23 October 2013) (n 20) Q162 and 179. 
LIMITED SCOPE FOR CHALLENGE
In reaching a decision, the minister is exercising a public law function and the decision
may therefore be challenged by way of  judicial review.43 There have been many judicial
review challenges to decisions refusing to convene a public inquiry, on the basis that the
decision was unreasonable, bearing in mind the nature of  the issue or the level of
concern, or that the minister had taken into account irrelevant considerations in deciding
to hold an inquiry,44 some of  which have been successful.45 In such circumstances, the
role of  the court is one of  review, not appeal. It cannot order a minister to convene an
inquiry, but can require the minister to remake the decision,46 which may ultimately result
in an inquiry being convened. 
Such proceedings, however, have their limitations. In order to bring an application for
judicial review, leave of  the court is required, which will not be granted unless the court
considers that the applicant has a ‘sufficient interest’ in the matter to which the
application relates.47 Few ordinary members of  the public with ‘sufficient interest’ are
familiar with, or have access to the resources to bring, judicial review proceedings.
Further, there is concern that recent controversial changes to judicial review introduced
by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, including the tightening of  the criteria for
granting judicial review and changes to the rules on the legal costs of  interveners in
judicial review proceedings, will make it harder for individuals, the families of  victims,
survivor support groups, NGOs and pressure groups to challenge ministerial and
governmental decisions, thus weakening judicial review as an important safeguard.
Judicial review is not, however, the only way in which the public may challenge a
decision to refuse a public inquiry. Under the doctrine of  ministerial responsibility,
ministers are answerable to Parliament for their actions and the actions of  their
departments. As we have seen in the case of  inquiries such as the IICSA, Mid
Staffordshire and Chilcot Inquiries, public pressure from individuals and pressure groups
via the media, social media and the lobbying of  MPs, has a significant, albeit informal and
non-legal role to play.48 However, this form of  informal public and political
accountability has also given rise to concerns over inconsistency. It is dependent on well-
mobilised groups building a sufficient momentum of  publicity and wider public support
to be able to influence ministers and Parliament. Numerous extraneous factors will come
into play and this route, as a form of  accountability, can by no means be assured. 
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43   A decision to refuse a public inquiry can be judicially reviewed irrespective of  whether or not reasons are
given. 
44   See Cabinet Secretary advice note (n 16).
45   For example, Shipman (n 24); Baha Mousa, R (on the Application of  Al-Skeini and Others) v Secretary of  State for
Defence [2007] 3 All ER 685; and Litvinenko, R (on the Application of  Litvinenko) v Secretary of  State for the Home
Department [2014] EWHC 194 (Admin).
46   See Jason Varuhas, ‘Ministerial Refusals to Initiate Public Inquiries: Review or Appeal’ (2014) 73(2) Cambridge
Law Journal 238, criticising the court’s approach in R (Litvinenko) (n 45) as approaching the case as though it
was hearing an appeal rather than exercising a supervisory function. 
47   See Senior Courts Act 1981, s 31(3). The Act does not define ‘sufficient interest’, but leaves the decision to
the court, which will consider, inter alia, the merits of  the challenge, and whether or not personal rights or
interests are involved: IRC v National Federation of  the Self  Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617. Where
judicial review is sought by survivor support groups, NGOs and pressure groups, the court may take into
account the reputation of  the body; whether a significant number of  members are affected by a decision; and
whether it is reasonable for the group or organisation to claim on behalf  of  its members: see R v Inspectorate
of  Pollution, ex parte Greenpeace Ltd (No 2) [1994] 4 All ER 329 and R v Secretary of  State for Foreign Affairs, ex parte
World Development Movement [1995] 1WLR 386.
48   For example, in the case of  the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry, Cure the NHS. See <www.curethenhs.co.uk>.
A minister’s discretion over whether or not to convene an inquiry and, if  so, the extent
to which it will be held in public, is very broad. As seen above, the decision-making
process is neither open nor transparent, which has in turn raised significant concern
about the motivation behind such decisions, particularly where the actions of  the
minister’s department, or the government itself, would be under scrutiny in any
subsequent public inquiry. However, concern over ministerial discretion exercised when
setting up a public inquiry goes further. As can be seen from the IICSA, even when a
public inquiry is announced, those who had called for the public inquiry may then refuse
to participate because of  the basis upon which it has been convened49 and whether it is
a statutory or non-statutory inquiry, which can have a fundamental influence on the
nature of  the inquiry and public perception of  its independence and integrity. 
Statutory and non-statutory inquiries
STATUTORY INQUIRIES HAVE ‘MORE TEETH’
When announcing the establishment of  the Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual
Abuse in 2014, the Home Secretary justified the decision to make it a non-statutory
inquiry on the basis that ‘it can begin its work sooner and, because the basis of  its early
work will be a review of  documentary evidence rather than interviews with witnesses who
might themselves still be subject to criminal investigations, it will be less likely to prejudice
those investigations’.50 The statement added that the panel would have access to
government papers and be free to call witnesses from organisations in the public and
private sectors, and in wider civil society, and, should the inquiry panel chair deem it
necessary, the government would convert it into a statutory public inquiry.51
Five months later, in a statement before the Home Affairs Committee,52 following
widespread media criticism and representations from survivors and their lawyers to the
effect that they would not participate unless the inquiry was a statutory inquiry, the Home
Secretary announced that the inquiry should have the powers of  a statutory inquiry. After
further intense pressure, the Home Secretary subsequently announced that the original
Independent Inquiry Panel would be disbanded and a new 2005 Act Inquiry, the IICSA,
would be convened, because of  the ‘robustness in law’ of  a statutory inquiry and its
power to compel witnesses to give evidence.53
In order to understand the strength of  feeling on the part of  the survivors, it is
important to look at the two key differences between statutory and non-statutory
inquiries. The first is that, unlike in the case of  non-statutory inquiries, the 2005 Act
confers on statutory inquiries the power to compel the giving of  evidence, including
compelling witnesses to attend to give oral evidence, produce documents and provide a
written statement.54 The Act also permits the chair to take evidence on oath,55 ensuring
that anyone who gives false evidence could face criminal sanctions. Sometimes, merely the
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49   Another example being the family of  Patrick Finucane, Northern Ireland solicitor, who initially opposed the
establishment on an inquiry under the 2005 Act because of  the powers given to ministers to impose
restrictions on the disclosure and publication of  evidence (see further discussion below).
50   HC Deb 7 July 2014, vol 584, col 25.
51   Position restated in HC Deb 3 November 2014, vol 587, col 543.
52   <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/home-affairs-
committee/the-work-of-the-home-secretary/oral/16895.html> 
53   HC Deb 4 February 2015, vol 592, cols 276–77.
54   2005 Act, s 21.
55   Ibid s 17.
existence of  powers to compel the giving of  evidence, without enforcement, is sufficient
to make a difference to the effectiveness of  an inquiry.
Counsel to the Robert Hamill Inquiry56 explained that, when the inquiry was set up,
it did not have powers of  compulsion over witnesses:
We were told unequivocally that the Protestant witnesses who were on the street
and were vital to it would not give evidence. We were able to convert, thinking we
needed to convert, to get powers under the 2005 Act, and as soon as we had the
powers we had the witnesses . . . As far as we are concerned, the real distinction
between a non-statutory inquiry and a statutory inquiry is those teeth.57
The second key difference is that, under the 2005 Act, there is a presumption that the
hearings will be held in public. Subject to restrictions imposed by the minister or chair,58
the chair must take such steps as he or she considers reasonable to secure that members
of  the public (including reporters) are able:
(a) to attend the inquiry or to see and hear a simultaneous transmission of  proceedings at
the inquiry; 
(b) to obtain or to view a record of  evidence and documents given, produced or provided
to the inquiry or inquiry panel.59
The intention is to provide transparency and openness to the proceedings whereby the
public, by attendance, or by the press televising or reporting the proceedings, are free to
draw their own informed conclusions. It also provides interested parties with an often
much sought-after opportunity for their voices to be heard.
Despite clear advantages to convening a statutory inquiry and the fact that the 2005
Act is generally recognised to be ‘good legislation’,60 when exercising their discretion,
ministers have frequently chosen to set up alternative forms of  non-statutory inquiry or
investigation, such as a Parliamentary Inquiry, Counsel of  Privy Councillors, Royal
Commission or independent review with elements of  a public hearing. These non-
statutory versions include high-profile inquiries such as the Chilcot Inquiry into the Iraq
conflict, the Butler Inquiry into intelligence on weapons of  mass destruction and the
Bichard Inquiry into child protection procedures following the Soham murders.61
Serious questions have been raised about the motivation behind decisions not to
convene a statutory inquiry and the effect on public perception and trust. Once again,
there is neither a formal process nor criteria by which to determine if  an inquiry is to be
statutory or non-statutory and no openness or transparency to the decision-making
process.62 There is a concern that ministers are apparently choosing to side-step the
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56   Inquiry into the actions of  the Royal Ulster Constabulary following the death of  Robert Hamill.
57   Ashley Underwood, oral evidence taken before the HL Select Committee (20 November 2013 ) (n 20) Q250.
58   2005 Act 2005, s 19.
59   Ibid s 18.
60   See HL Select Committee (n 11) para 214. However, there have been notable critics, particularly when the
Inquiries Bill was first presented, chiefly over ministerial powers and the use of  restriction notices, including:
the panel members of  the Bloody Sunday Inquiry; Amnesty International; and in an all-party motion
introduced before Dáil Éireann. See the discussion in Beer et al (n 14) paras 1.67–71. Concern since appears
to have eased for some, as the extent to which those powers have been used in practice has not been as great
as initially feared (see n 75 below).
61   Inquiry into child protection procedures in Humberside Police and Cambridgeshire Constabulary following
the murder of  Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells.
62   It would appear that informal discussions take place at ministerial level and the Prime Minister has the final
say: see Shailesh Vara MP, oral evidence taken before the HL Select Committee (11 December 2013) (n 20)
Q327–28. 
legislation when it suits them because it is felt the 2005 Act somehow ‘ties their hands, is
too complicated, [or] is too public’.63 During the HL Select Committee, Baroness
Buscombe posed the question:
Why should the public have any trust in a non-statutory inquiry when, the very
people who were behind that legislation instantly chose to avoid it when, for
example, setting up the Iraq inquiry?64 . . . Can we not read from that, being
cynical, that this means that some of  the truth can be avoided where the inquiry
is non-statutory?65
There is no express presumption in favour of  using the 2005 Act, in the Act itself  or
elsewhere. Convening non-statutory inquiries under the general ministerial prerogative is
a well-established practice. In the pre-2005 Court of  Appeal case of  Crampton,66 Sir
Thomas Bingham MR stated that, simply because a statute gives a minister power to
establish an inquiry, it does not mean the minister lacks authority to establish an inquiry
of  any other kind, nor that the minister must establish all inquiries under the statute that
provides compulsory powers. However, in the House of  Lords debate on the 2014 Select
Committee Report, Lord Trimble referred to one of  the main intentions behind the 2005
Act and the explanatory notes to the 2005 Bill, which was ‘to consolidate numerous pieces
of  subject-specific legislation’ and ‘to provide a comprehensive statutory framework for
inquiries set by Ministers to look into matters of  public concern’67 stating that:
That language points to the Act being used for inquiries generally. It does not say
that the Act is optional . . . That would be a rather novel proposition for
legislation. I know that the practice has developed of  non-statutory inquiries and
it is perhaps late in the day to challenge that now. However, I suggest that it is
not really within the original intention of  the Act, which is why we made the
recommendations we did . . .68
The Select Committee recommended that:
. . . inquiries into issues of  public concern should normally be held under the Act.
This is essential where Article 2 of  the ECHR is engaged.69 No inquiry should
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69   Articles 2 and 3 ECHR impose on governments an obligation to conduct an effective official investigation
into any death resulting from the use of  force or resulting from the state’s failure to protect the right to life
(see, for example, the ECHR determination in Osman v UK (1998) 29 EHRR 245; McCann v UK (1995) 21
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summary of  the Article 2 requirements in R (Amin) v Secretary of  State for the Home Department [2003] UKHL
51). It is only inquiries with statutory powers to compel the production of  documents and the attendance of
witnesses to give evidence on oath that will be compliant with Article 2. Also, the lack of  rules governing
public and private hearings are more likely to result in non-statutory inquiries being non-compliant with
Article 2 than statutory inquiries. See HL Select Committee (n 11) paras 69–76. 
be set up without the power to compel the attendance of  witnesses unless
ministers are confident that all potential witnesses will attend.
It recommended retaining the possibility of  inquiries being held otherwise than under the
Act where, for example, security issues are involved, or other sensitive issues which
require evidence to be heard in secret, adding ‘Ministers should give reasons for any
decision to hold an inquiry otherwise than under the Act.’70
This was rejected by the government, asserting that the 2005 Act represents an
important starting point and that ‘Ministers should not feel constrained from considering
other options which may be better suited to the circumstances’, interpreting s 1(1)71 as
being merely permissive, providing flexibility as to whether to use the Act or not, noting
that s 15 allows for conversion into a 2005 Act inquiry if  organisations or individuals
refuse to co-operate with a non-statutory inquiry.72
CHOOSING A NON-STATUTORY INQUIRY
Whilst taking great issue with the government’s rejection of  the recommendation that
public inquiries should normally be held under the 2005 Act, for reasons of  public
perception and trust and discussed in greater detail below, it is accepted that there will be
occasions where convening a non-statutory inquiry will be appropriate. Examples might
include where there is a need for evidence to be heard in secret for the protection of  matters
of  national importance and national security or where the release of  material might
jeopardise economic measures concerning Britain’s economy.73 It may also be concluded,
for example, that powers of  compulsion over witnesses are not appropriate because
evidence is being sought from citizens of  foreign jurisdictions.74 In such cases, there is a
balance to be found between the need to maximise the public nature of  an inquiry and the
importance of  enabling an effective investigation to take place. An inquiry with severe
restrictions to public access might, on occasion, be better than no inquiry at all.75
Practical arguments have also been put forward in favour of  non-statutory inquiries.
Sir John Chilcot, chair of  the Chilcot Inquiry, felt that ‘the powers of  compulsion
contribute to an overly formal or court-like adversarial process’ in what is an inquisitorial
procedure.76 A number of  witnesses appearing before the HL Select Committee thought
that the taking of  evidence on oath would not make a practical difference, largely because,
with the mass of  documents and other evidence before the inquiry, anyone lying risked
being caught out and anyone minded to lie would do so on oath or otherwise.77
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However, irrespective of  the extent to which it is thought that statutory powers of
compulsion over witnesses would make a practical difference, thought must be given to
the fact that choosing to convene a non-statutory inquiry can, and does, give rise to major
issues over public perception and trust. A 2010 Cabinet Secretary advice note stated:
Non-statutory inquiries (e.g. Chilcot) are normally used where the actions in
question are mainly those of  public officials, who can be expected (or to an
extent required by government) to cooperate without the need for the inquiry to
have powers of  compulsion. If  such cooperation is not forthcoming a non-
statutory inquiry can be turned into a statutory one, with the relevant powers.78
A major role of  public inquiries is to hold the executive to account. I would argue strongly
therefore that, where the actions in question are mainly those of  public officials, for
example, in a case such as the IICSA, dealing with allegations of  an establishment cover-
up,79 it is even more important to ensure public perceptions of  integrity and to ensure
that, from the outset, there is a presumption that hearings will be held in public and that
the inquiry is given powers of  compulsion over witnesses and the power to take evidence
on oath. 
PUBLIC INFLUENCE
The background to the establishment of  the IICSA shows that pressure from survivors
and their families, pressure groups, the public and media can result in a decision to
convert, or disband, a non-statutory inquiry in favour of  convening a statutory inquiry. It
remains to be seen whether this is the start of  public pressure increasing the proportion
of  statutory rather than non-statutory inquiries that are convened. 
Relying on this form of  public pressure as a process of  accountability brings with it
its own concerns. The failure to get the model right from the outset, and ministers being
seen to backtrack on previous decisions, risks damaging confidence in the public inquiry
process itself. A further concern is the way in which this can lead to inconsistencies
between inquiries. In the case of  the IICSA, the survivors, their families and the pressure
groups were well informed about the significance of  the distinction between the two
types of  inquiries. Most members of  the wider general public are unlikely to know if  an
inquiry is statutory or non-statutory, nor appreciate the significance. Many might simply
assume that a public inquiry, set up to investigate such serious issues, would have the
power to enable it to take evidence on oath and require documents to be produced, in a
way they are familiar with in the court system. Limited public understanding of  the
implications of  the decision made reduces the potential for public scrutiny and the
potential for public pressure to be brought to bear. 
The power of  a minister to decide whether or not a public inquiry will be a statutory
or non-statutory inquiry is hugely significant because of  the profound effect that decision
can have on the powers, effectiveness and degree of  openness of  the subsequent inquiry,
the role of  which is to hold those in authority to account. The fact that unease is
expressed over ministers appearing to deliberately side-step the use of  the 2005 Act when
it suits is a major cause for concern. In the case of  the IICSA, public pressure was
sufficient to force a change but, in that case, the calls went further. A further, highly
contentious issue was the identity of  the chair to the inquiry. 
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The chair
SIGNIFICANCE
The choice of  chair is critical to the success of  a public inquiry. If  the public is to have
confidence in the inquiry process and its recommendations it must have confidence in the
chair. The public identifies with the chair; often, for example, with the Leveson and Chilcot
Inquiries, an inquiry is identified by, and inextricably linked with, the identity of  its chair. 
The majority of  inquiries are chaired by a judge,80 retired judge, or senior member of
the legal profession,81 chosen for their experience and expertise in assessing and handling
large volumes of  evidence, their publicly recognised independence and their proven
integrity and authority. Others are chaired by senior civil servants,82 or others outside of
the legal professions,83 known for their standing and expertise in the subject matter of
the inquiry, or in the operation of  public sector bodies, or where the highly politically
sensitive nature of  the inquiry means it is not appropriate for a judge to be involved.84
The inquiry may be undertaken by the chair alone, or with one or more other members
forming an inquiry panel. In addition to sharing the workload, panel members may bring
a diversity of  professional backgrounds, expertise, knowledge and perspective. The
existence of  a panel can also enhance public confidence in the fairness of  the process and
add credence to the inquiry’s conclusions.85
TIMING
Despite the choice of  chair being critical to the success of  the inquiry, the appointment
process and announcement is often carried out in alarming haste. Under s 6 of  the 2005
Act, when convening a 2005 Act public inquiry, the minister must make a statement to
Parliament to that effect, ‘as soon as is reasonably practicable’.86 That statement must also
specify who has been appointed as chair and whether the minister has, or proposes to
appoint, any other members to the panel.87 Mounting public pressure to announce the
establishment of  a public inquiry, and the fact that both statements must be made at the
same time, means the selection process may take place over a very short period of  time
with very little time for deliberations and, at times, an astonishingly short amount of  time
for discussions with the proposed chair in advance of  the announcement. Sir Robert
Francis, the chair of  the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry, in his evidence to the HL Select
Committee, stated that he was phoned up without warning and asked to decide within an
hour whether to accept the appointment ‘because the Minister was in a hurry to make an
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86   2005 Act, s 6(1).
87   Ibid s 6(2).
announcement’.88 Sir John Chilcot had 10 minutes in which to accept the invitation to
chair the Inquiry into the Iraq conflict.89
The 2014 Select Committee Report stated:
We are not saying that ministerial haste has ever resulted in the appointment of
a chairman whose appointment might subsequently have been regretted, but
there is much to be said for a process which is less hurried and more transparent
. . . We believe the fact of  the inquiry and the name of  the chairman should not
necessarily be the subject of  the same statement, and we recommend that section
6(2) should be amended accordingly.90
This recommendation was accepted by the government,91 but the relevant legislation has
yet to be amended. Once in force, it will allow the minister greater time in which to
consider the appointment and hear representations from victims, survivors and their
families and other interested parties. The extent to which this will transpire in practice
remains to be seen. 
INDEPENDENCE
The chair must be impartial92 and that impartiality must be beyond doubt in order to
command public trust in the chair and the inquiry itself. A difficult balance needs to be
struck between identifying an individual with sufficient knowledge, expertise and interest
in the issues and them being so close to the subject matter of  the inquiry as to give rise
to a conflict of  interest.93 Once again, neither the decision-making process nor the
criteria applied in any given case are in the public domain, limiting the scope for public
scrutiny. Draft Cabinet Office Guidance,94 which is non-binding, states only that, when
making an appointment:
. . . the Minister may seek advice from professional, regulatory or other bodies in
the appropriate field . . . the department should not approach any individual until
the Minister has been consulted . . . The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of  State
should be consulted where there is a proposal to appoint a judge or legal
officer.95
Advice is likely to be sought from people who have handled inquiries and dealt with the
proposed chair in the past. In politically contentious matters, the Prime Minister would
be consulted.96
This is in sharp contrast, however, to the appointment of  judges where the Judicial
Appointments Commission (JAC), an independent public body, is responsible for
selecting candidates to recommend for judicial appointment. The JAC includes lay
members, who provide an independent voice and ensure a public input into the
appointment, distancing the process from political influence. The Lord Chancellor’s role
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in the appointment of  individual members of  the judiciary is deliberately limited to avoid
the risk of  ‘politicising the appointments process’ and ‘undermining the independence of
the judiciary’.97 As a result, particularly where the chair is not a member of  the judiciary,
the lack of  independence of  the current process, coupled with its lack of  transparency,
makes it vulnerable to allegations of  politically motivated appointments and raises
concern that those appointed lack sufficient independence from the executive and
political establishment. 
The lack of  openness to the decision-making process may also give rise to wider
concerns over independence. Shortly after the appointment of  Lord Leveson,98 a senior
member of  the judiciary, to the position of  chair to the Inquiry into the Culture, Practice
and Ethics of  the Press, reports emerged of  Lord Leveson having recently attended two
parties at the home of  Rupert Murdoch’s son-in-law. Questions were raised about his
ability to be seen to be independent. Chris Bryant, the Labour MP who had been
campaigning on phone-hacking, said: ‘If  this had been known from the start it might be
fine – as with every step, transparency has come by dragging it out of  them.’99
Links with the establishment were a major cause for concern when the Independent
Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse was convened in 2014. The Home Secretary
announced that the panel chair would be Baroness Butler-Sloss,100 the first female Lord
Justice of  Appeal and, until 2004, the highest-ranking female judge in the UK, and an
expert in the field of  child protection and the chair of  the Cleveland Child Abuse Inquiry.
From the time of  the announcement, however, many expressed concerns over Baroness
Butler-Sloss’s links to the establishment, as the sister of  the former Lord Chancellor
Michael Havers, Attorney General in the 1980s, and over his role in previous
investigations. Whilst not questioning Baroness Butler-Sloss’s integrity, there was concern
that she would be seen as part of  the establishment, which would undermine public
confidence. Following intense pressure from victims groups, MPs and the media,101
within a week Baroness Butler-Sloss had stepped down.
Two months later it was announced that Fiona Woolf, a solicitor who had held a
number of  senior positions including President of  the Law Society and Lord Mayor of
London, had been appointed as the new chair.102 Fiona Woolf  soon faced calls to resign,
from survivors groups and MPs,103 and there was widespread media coverage over
personal links with the former Home Secretary, Lord Brittan, who was Home Secretary
in the 1980s and who was likely to be called to give evidence over his handling of
allegations of  abuse during his time in office.104
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The government stood by the appointment. However, after mounting pressure, and
survivors’ pledges to boycott an inquiry with her in the chair,105 Fiona Woolf  resigned,
recognising she did not command the survivors’ confidence. It was subsequently
announced106 that the original panel would be disbanded and Justice Lowell Goddard, a
New Zealand High Court Judge with no ties to the UK establishment nor persons likely
to be investigated, would chair a new 2005 Act inquiry, the IICSA, assisted by panel
members.107 As the Home Secretary stated when first announcing the inquiry, ‘With
allegations as serious as these, the public needs to have complete confidence in the
integrity of  the investigation’s findings . . . ’108
It is clear that public pressure can bring sufficient weight to bear to influence the
appointment and the government must listen to the concerns of  the public. However, as
argued above, public pressure from individuals and pressure groups via the media, social
media and the lobbying of  MPs is an inconsistent form of  accountability. Further, there
have been words of  caution over the nature of  public consultation. Sharon Evans, one of
the original panel members of  the Independent Panel Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse,
warned against listening to the vocal minority ‘engaging in personal attacks against panel
members’ instead of  the majority of  abuse survivors.109 Baroness Butler-Sloss cautioned
against giving victims too much influence over who chairs an inquiry and facing the risk
of  having a chair without the necessary experience for the role.110 The chair111 appointed
must be seen to be impartial and independent in all respects: independent from the
government and the executive, but also independent from survivors, their families,
NGOs, pressure groups and the media. 
Terms of reference
CONSULTATION
The final power exercised by a minister when convening a public inquiry is the power to
set the terms of  reference. The terms of  reference are a crucial factor in determining an
inquiry’s ambit, length, complexity, cost and ultimately its success. An inquiry may only
investigate those matters that are covered by its terms of  reference.112 If  the terms of
reference are too wide, it may result in unnecessary cost and delay, and may introduce
extraneous questions which merely confuse the essential issues.113 If  the terms of
reference are too narrow, it may appear that the government is attempting to deflect
criticism or avoid difficult political issues by restricting the scope of  the inquiry. 
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The minister convening an inquiry is responsible for setting the terms of  reference114
and may at any time amend them if  he or she considers that the public interest so
requires.115 Whilst Parliament must be informed of  the terms of  reference of  a statutory
inquiry,116 it has little involvement in determining the terms of  reference of  either
statutory or non-statutory inquiries. 
In contrast to the previous decisions made when convening a public inquiry, when
setting the terms of  reference of  a statutory inquiry there is a legal requirement for the
minister to consult. Section 5(4) of  the 2005 Act provides: ‘Before setting out or
amending the terms of  reference of  a statutory inquiry, the minister must consult the
person he proposes to appoint, or has appointed, as chairman.’ However, in practice, the
extent of  the consultation is often extremely limited. There is often strong public and
political pressure to announce an inquiry and its terms of  reference very quickly.
Consultation frequently takes place before the chair has had chance to undertake more
than a very cursory consideration of  very limited material and before the chair is well
placed to provide meaningful input.117 In evidence to the HL Select Committee,
Sir Robert Francis spoke of  the ‘panic’ when a public inquiry is announced with terms of
reference stating: ‘A chairman is found at an hour’s or even less notice and given some
terms of  reference, which of  course he is “consulted on” at a point where he has no more
information than he has read in the newspapers about the subject.’118 The minister may
subsequently rely on the power to amend terms of  reference, but that brings with it the
risk of  undermining work that has already been undertaken or creating a lack of  clarity
that exposes the inquiry to judicial review challenges. 
As with the announcement of  the chair, for statutory inquiries, the terms of  reference
have to be announced in the same statement to Parliament as the announcement of  the
inquiry itself.119 The 2014 Select Committee Report recommended that a short ‘cooling-
off ’ period be allowed after an announcement of  an inquiry and draft terms of  reference,
while the chair familiarises him or herself  with the material and consultation takes place,
with the final terms of  reference being the subject of  a separate statement.120 In its
response, the government rejected this suggestion, stating ‘terms of  reference and any
amendments to them, are invariably discussed and agreed with the chair’ adding ‘it is
neither practical nor sensible for there to be two sets of  terms of  reference in the public
domain’.121
Whilst it may be possible in some cases to clearly define the terms of  an inquiry from
the outset, there will be many instances where that is not the case. It is argued that the
government’s response fails to address the reality of  the situation, which is that, due to
time pressure, consultation that currently takes place at this stage is often merely
perfunctory and discussion over the final terms of  reference continue once the chair has
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had the opportunity to familiarise him or herself  with the material.122 Relying on powers
to amend risks undermining public confidence in the process and exposing it to legal
challenge. There is a strong argument that the process would be better served by
regularising the position by a change to the legislation to allow for initial draft, or
indicative, terms of  reference to be announced, with final terms of  reference being the
subject of  a separate statement following a short period of  meaningful consultation. 
INFLUENCE
In addition to consultation with the chair, witnesses before the HL Select Committee also
called for the minister to be required to have regard to, though not be bound by,
consultation with core participants123 and the wider public, who may have valuable input
on the formulation of  the terms of  reference.124 Currently, whether statutory or non-
statutory, practice can differ greatly between inquiries. The Foot and Mouth and Detainee
Inquiries, both non-statutory inquiries, did have a period of  consultation for three
months before the Inquiry started, during which there were discussions between the chair
and government representatives, as well as informal consultation with relevant
stakeholders.125 The Chilcot Inquiry, also non-statutory, had no consultation at all.126 The
core participants to the Al Sweady Inquiry, a statutory inquiry, were given an opportunity
to feed into the terms of  reference and the chair invited comments on the terms of
reference at the outset of  the proceedings.127 In contrast, there was no consultation
exercise on the Mid Staffordshire Inquiry, a statutory inquiry, because of  the time
pressure under which the inquiry was operating.128
Whilst not going so far as including ‘the wider public’, the 2014 Select Committee
Report recommended that interested parties, particularly victims and victims’ families,
should be given an opportunity to make representations about the final terms of
reference, ‘which may have the additional benefit of  avoiding judicial review of  the terms
of  reference, as happened with the Robert Hamill Inquiry’.129 The government accepted
the recommendation in part, with the caveat that ‘this proposal would not be helpful in
cases where the Government wished to respond swiftly to an issue or issues of  public
concern and it would be potentially problematic in cases where there are multiple
victims’,130 leaving the position open to varied interpretation. As a result, the potential for
terms of  reference to be decided in undue haste, without the benefit of  wider
consultation, remains. A change in legislation allowing final terms of  reference to be
announced in a separate statement to the announcement of  the inquiry, after a period of
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meaningful consultation with the chair, would also allow time for consultation with
interested parties and, if  appropriate, the wider public.
Consultation and engagement with core participants and the wider public may also
assist with managing expectations. In evidence to the HL Select Committee, Peter Riddell,
a panel member of  the Detainee Inquiry,131 spoke of  the difficulties and frustrations over
the inquiry’s terms of  reference. During that inquiry, there was a clash of  expectations
between the panel’s focus on the awareness of  the British government and intelligence
agencies of  alleged mistreatment of  British detainees and the expectations of  the
detainees and NGOs that there would be inquiries into allegations of  torture.132 This led
ultimately to a boycott by the detainees, their lawyers and NGOs. During the same
evidence session, Karl Mackie on behalf  of  CEDR133 suggested:
. . . a one-month period of  consultation, particularly with key potential
stakeholders in the inquiry subject matter, to consider how to draft terms of
reference that match the needs of  the parties and create legitimate expectations
of  what the inquiry process could deliver rather than have a problem of
expectations at the end of  the process . . .134
The IICSA illustrates how public pressure outside a formal consultation process may, on
occasions, be sufficient to influence or force the amendment of  an inquiry’s terms of
reference. The terms of  reference for the original non-statutory Independent Panel
Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse set out the scope of  the inquiry, including the statement that
the inquiry panel would ‘cover England and Wales’ and ‘consider these matters from the
1970s to the present’.135 When, in 2015, in response to sustained public pressure and the
resignation of  two chairs to the inquiry, the panel was disbanded and a new statutory
inquiry convened, the Home Secretary also reviewed the terms of  reference in light of
feedback from survivors. This resulted in a widening of  the scope of  the inquiry,
including the removal of  any cut-off  date for the work of  the inquiry and liaison to take
place between the inquiry and its counterparts elsewhere in the UK.136 However, as seen
above, such change is dependent on well-mobilised groups building a momentum of
publicity and support, sufficient to trigger engagement of  the minister, and is no
substitute for a formal process of  consultation. 
Whether through formal or informal processes, public consultation must be carefully
managed. Not all public concerns can or will be addressed in the final terms of  reference,
which may result in the public feeling ignored. Clear communication of  what is and is not
to be considered by the inquiry is essential, as is the extent to which an inquiry is or is not
required to make findings of  responsibility and accountability.137
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The Chilcot Inquiry138 has been the subject of  much criticism, including for its length
and the delay in publishing its report. One of  the difficulties facing the inquiry was that
its terms of  reference are so broad. The inquiry was set up to consider Britain’s
involvement in the Iraq conflict between mid-2001 and July 2009, from the run-up to the
conflict and the subsequent military action to its aftermath. When speaking to the BBC,
Lord Butler139 stated that governments, when setting up inquiries of  this sort, ‘try to
satisfy everybody . . . They do not want to be seen to be restricting anything, which can,
or does, lead to great problems.’ He concluded that, when pressing for a public inquiry
with a wide remit, people need to be mindful of  unforeseen consequences. There is the
potential for complainants to press for an inquiry to be so far-reaching it may not be
manageable and they may be frustrated in the results sought.140 In the case of  the IICSA,
the significant widening of  the terms of  reference in light of  feedback from the survivors,
whilst welcomed by those pressing for change, will also result in the survivors, who in
many cases have already waited decades to be heard, facing a substantially longer and
much more drawn-out process.
Conclusion 
It is essential that the public has confidence and trust in the independence and integrity of
an inquiry if  it is to command confidence in its process and ultimately its findings. The
minister is afforded considerable discretion over whether or not to convene a public inquiry,
the extent to which any inquiry will be heard in public, its powers, the identity of  its chair
and the scope of  its terms of  reference. The way in which that discretion is exercised has a
significant bearing on the nature and public perception of  any subsequent inquiry. 
Concerns are frequently raised about the motivation behind the exercise of  the
ministerial discretion. One of  the key roles of  a public inquiry is to hold those in
authority to account and concern over conflicts of  interest will inevitably arise where the
minister exercising that discretion is a member of  the establishment and is often the
minister of  the department, or a member of  the government, that is itself  under scrutiny.
Irrespective of  the extent to which concerns of  this nature are justified, they undermine
public confidence in the public inquiry process. 
There have long been complaints over the lack of  openness and transparency to the
decision-making process, which exacerbates those concerns and reduces scope for public
accountability and scrutiny. There is a lack of  any formal structure for interested parties
and the wider public to make representations to ministers and there are practical
limitations to judicial review as a safeguard. The IICSA illustrates that public pressure can
be sufficient to force a minister to revisit those decisions, but reliance on public and
media pressure, in the absence of  any formal process for representations or consultation,
can give rise to inconsistent approaches between inquiries and to public uncertainty. 
Whilst the Government Response to the 2014 Select Committee Report accepted
some recommended changes to the decision-making process, to make it more transparent
and open to public engagement, many recommendations were rejected. It is argued, an
opportunity to improve public confidence and trust in the public inquiry process was
missed. Publishing broad criteria or guidance by which to justify a decision whether or
not to convene an inquiry, and the extent to which an inquiry will be heard in public, less
haste and greater transparency to the appointment process for the chair, a presumption
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that public inquiries would normally be held under the 2005 Act and greater engagement
and consultation with interested parties and the public over the terms of  reference of  a
public inquiry would increase scope for greater public scrutiny and accountability and
would go a long way to address many of  the concerns expressed. In a 2013 letter from
the Home Secretary to the coroner of  the Litvinenko Inquest, one of  the reasons given
for initially refusing to convene a public inquiry into the events surrounding the death of
Litvinenko, and possible Russian state involvement, was that:
An inquest managed and run by an independent coroner is more readily
explainable to some of  our foreign partners, and the integrity of  the process
more readily grasped, than an inquiry, established by the Government, under a
Chairman appointed by the Government which has the power to see
Government material, potentially relevant to their interests, in secret.141
It is not, however, only ‘foreign partners’ who need to understand the public inquiry
process and be convinced of  its integrity; this applies equally to the UK public as a whole.
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